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Female and male voice required for narrations
LTK6307945936X
We are scouting for voice-over talent with British accent - to work on a potential project which could involve weekly, continuous work.
The project would involve -
1. Batch of 6 to 9 articles to be narrated and recorded per week (see attached article for rough size).
2. 48 hour turn around for the entire batch.
As is obvious - this assignment can represent consistent, weekly cash flow for you.
Do let us know if this proposition interests you - and also whether you are capable of completing such amounts of recordings, within these schedules without compromising on quality.
Budget USD$250 - $499 Aug 15, 2006 13:18:22 (GMT -05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) Aug 22, 2006 00:00:00 (GMT -05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) No (click here to learn more about
)
Closed
88
88
0 direct invitation(s) have been sent by the voice seeker resulting in 0 audition(s) and/or proposal(s) so far.
The project would involve -
1. Batch of 6 to 9 articles to be narrated and recorded per week (see attached article for rough size).
2. 48 hour turn around for the entire batch.
As is obvious - this assignment can represent consistent, weekly cash flow for you.
Do let us know if this proposition interests you - and also whether you are capable of completing such amounts of recordings, within these schedules without compromising on quality.
Budget USD$250 - $499 Aug 15, 2006 13:18:22 (GMT -05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) Aug 22, 2006 00:00:00 (GMT -05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) No (click here to learn more about
)
Closed
88
88
0 direct invitation(s) have been sent by the voice seeker resulting in 0 audition(s) and/or proposal(s) so far.
Project Parameters
None
Flexible - USD 250
Promos
English - British
Not defined
Young Adult Female OR Young Adult Male OR Middle Age Female OR Middle Age Male OR Senior Female OR Senior Male
• Audio files must be delivered via FTP
There are no special pre-, post-, or production requirements for this project.
Not defined
Not defined
No
Not defined
Script Details
Yes
The war beyond the war
IN CHESS they call it a Zugzwang, the position that arises when your next move, any next move, is liable to lead to disaster. That is roughly where Ehud Olmert finds himself this week. If Israel's prime minister ceases fire now, Hizbullah will claim that it has won simply because, after three weeks of pounding by the regional superpower, its men were still putting up a fight and firing their rockets into Israel's towns and villages. But if Mr Olmert chooses instead to push deeper into Lebanon, he risks sinking Israel in a costly guerrilla war like the one it thought it had ended by leaving Lebanon six years ago.
To avoid these risks, Mr Olmert is therefore aiming for a middle way that may not exist. He said on August 2nd that Israel would continue to push into southern Lebanon until a “strong” international force arrives to finish the job of disarming Hizbullah. So simple—and so blithe. Mr Olmert was speaking on a day when Hizbullah fired a record number of rockets into Israel, at a moment when no international force existed, and when the plans to create one remained a study in vagueness (see article). Who would put up the troops? Would they really be willing or able to disarm Hizbullah by force? If not by force, under what sort of deal? Amid the unknowns, the nearest thing to a certainty was that the war would end as messily as it began, with no clear win for either side.
Iran's proxy, and America's
It is sometimes no bad thing to end with a draw. Lopsided victories, like the ones Israel won in 1948 and 1967, can leave a residue of hubris on one side and shattered pride on the other that block peacemaking for decades. By contrast, the war of 1973, which both Israel and Egypt claimed to have won, restored Egyptian honour and persuaded Israel that it was worth exchanging the Sinai peninsula for peace with its strongest neighbour. The Palestinian intifada of the late 1980s also ended in a draw of sorts. The Palestinians could not push Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza but nor could Israel suppress the Palestinian fever for an end to occupation. This was one of the things that helped convince Yitzhak Rabin of the need to give Yasser Arafat the embryo of what should have become an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.
The present war is one of the bitterest yet between Israel and the Arabs. Never before have Israelis faced such a sustained, indiscriminate bombardment in their own homes; by comparison, Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles of 1991 were a passing squall. And not since its independence war has Israel felt entitled to clear the battlefield by ordering hundreds of thousands of Arab civilians to flee their houses and villages, as it has these past weeks in Lebanon. Despite the hundreds of dead, most of them Lebanese civilians, this has not yet been one of the more lethal regional wars. Yet it has already added disproportionately to the brimming pot of hatred.
For all the blood and anger, might this war lead to another reweighing of costs and benefits of the sort that has unblocked diplomacy after previous hard-fought draws between Israel and its neighbours? Much will depend on the ingenuity of mediators. But the omens, this time, are not promising.
This is not because of the complexity of the quarrel between Israel and Lebanon, but for the opposite reason. These two countries do not in fact have much to quarrel about. There is between them no painful land-for-peace deal that has to be made, of the sort that Israel made with Egypt and must one day make with the Palestinians. (The “disputed” scrap of land known as the Shebaa Farms is at most a pretext Hizbullah uses to justify its fighting.) Indeed, a case can be made that this particular conflict is not primarily between Israel and Lebanon at all so much as it is between Israel and Iran, Hizbullah's mentor—and between America and Iran. That makes it much harder to resolve, not least because the superpower, so far from being a mediator, is in effect a protagonist, competing with Iran for domination of the post-Saddam Middle East, and to some extent tempted in this war to use Israel as a proxy.
This is a dreadful new turn. The century-long conflict between Zionism and the Arabs of Palestine has been hard enough to settle on its own, without additional global and regional rivalries superimposed. The cold war prolonged the fight in Palestine. It is no coincidence that some of the most promising peacemaking came after the Soviet Union stopped competing with America to be the dominant power in the Middle East. Now the core conflict is once again becoming entangled in a bigger one—perhaps even more dangerous this time because Iran is more eager than were the secular Arab states of the 1950s and 1960s to put Islam at the centre of the anti-Zionist cause.
From Iran's point of view, Hizbullah's audacity against Israel is a magnificent advertisement for its particular brand of Shia piety. This profoundly discomfits those Arab allies of America such as Saudi Arabia, which aspires to lead Sunni Islam but is made to look feeble whenever it sits on the sidelines during an Arab-Israeli war. It unsettles Egypt and Jordan, which have made their unpopular peaces with Israel. And in the Palestinian territories it fortifies Hamas, which finds religious objections to peace with Israel, at the expense of the more accommodating secularists of Fatah. Even al-Qaeda, which detests Shias and murders them in Iraq, has felt obliged this week to join the fray. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, popped up from his cave to say that Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine were now just one seamless front of warfare between Islam and the Jews and crusaders.
Only disconnect
If the Lebanon war is not just a scrap between neighbours but also a proxy war between Iran and America, how is it going to be possible to bring about a durable peace once it ends? One idea gathering pace among some American foreign-policy realists—in opposition to the neoconservatives—such as Henry Kissinger is to seize this opportunity to bring about the “grand bargain” that has been mooted for years between America and Iran. Since all the region's quarrels—Iran's bomb, Iraq's future, the isolation of Syria, the Hizbullah state inside Lebanon and the unrequited cause of the Palestinians—are interlinked, why not think now about starting to sort out the lot of them?
It certainly would not hurt, after a week in which the Security Council has again told Iran to stop enriching uranium, for America to emphasise again the political and economic benefits Iran stands to gain by complying with this demand. America and Iran must talk. All the same, a bargain this grandiose may be beyond the reach of even the most creative diplomacy.
So it may be more sensible to disconnect some of the pieces than to join too many together. In particular, the outlook for the Palestinians would be less bleak if sundry outsiders did not periodically hijack their cause to mobilise Muslim emotions against Israel, America or both. Between Israel and the Palestinians there is probably still a deal to be made if both show enough courage and generosity. In the end, it is only Israel that can give the Palestinians their state, and only the Palestinians can give Israel the legitimacy it craves in the Middle East. In a region of conflict, it is these two peoples whose interests coincide most closely. Solving that problem remains the best of all ways to promote a wider peace. The war beyond the war
IN CHESS they call it a Zugzwang, the position that arises when your next move, any next move, is liable to lead to disaster. That is roughly where Ehud Olmert finds himself this week. If Israel's prime minister ceases fire now, Hizbullah will claim that it has won simply because, after three weeks of pounding by the regional superpower, its men were still putting up a fight and firing their rockets into Israel's towns and villages. But if Mr Olmert chooses instead to push deeper into Lebanon, he risks sinking Israel in a costly guerrilla war like the one it thought it had ended by leaving Lebanon six years ago.
IN CHESS they call it a Zugzwang, the position that arises when your next move, any next move, is liable to lead to disaster. That is roughly where Ehud Olmert finds himself this week. If Israel's prime minister ceases fire now, Hizbullah will claim that it has won simply because, after three weeks of pounding by the regional superpower, its men were still putting up a fight and firing their rockets into Israel's towns and villages. But if Mr Olmert chooses instead to push deeper into Lebanon, he risks sinking Israel in a costly guerrilla war like the one it thought it had ended by leaving Lebanon six years ago.
To avoid these risks, Mr Olmert is therefore aiming for a middle way that may not exist. He said on August 2nd that Israel would continue to push into southern Lebanon until a “strong” international force arrives to finish the job of disarming Hizbullah. So simple—and so blithe. Mr Olmert was speaking on a day when Hizbullah fired a record number of rockets into Israel, at a moment when no international force existed, and when the plans to create one remained a study in vagueness (see article). Who would put up the troops? Would they really be willing or able to disarm Hizbullah by force? If not by force, under what sort of deal? Amid the unknowns, the nearest thing to a certainty was that the war would end as messily as it began, with no clear win for either side.
Iran's proxy, and America's
It is sometimes no bad thing to end with a draw. Lopsided victories, like the ones Israel won in 1948 and 1967, can leave a residue of hubris on one side and shattered pride on the other that block peacemaking for decades. By contrast, the war of 1973, which both Israel and Egypt claimed to have won, restored Egyptian honour and persuaded Israel that it was worth exchanging the Sinai peninsula for peace with its strongest neighbour. The Palestinian intifada of the late 1980s also ended in a draw of sorts. The Palestinians could not push Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza but nor could Israel suppress the Palestinian fever for an end to occupation. This was one of the things that helped convince Yitzhak Rabin of the need to give Yasser Arafat the embryo of what should have become an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.
The present war is one of the bitterest yet between Israel and the Arabs. Never before have Israelis faced such a sustained, indiscriminate bombardment in their own homes; by comparison, Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles of 1991 were a passing squall. And not since its independence war has Israel felt entitled to clear the battlefield by ordering hundreds of thousands of Arab civilians to flee their houses and villages, as it has these past weeks in Lebanon. Despite the hundreds of dead, most of them Lebanese civilians, this has not yet been one of the more lethal regional wars. Yet it has already added disproportionately to the brimming pot of hatred.
For all the blood and anger, might this war lead to another reweighing of costs and benefits of the sort that has unblocked diplomacy after previous hard-fought draws between Israel and its neighbours? Much will depend on the ingenuity of mediators. But the omens, this time, are not promising.
This is not because of the complexity of the quarrel between Israel and Lebanon, but for the opposite reason. These two countries do not in fact have much to quarrel about. There is between them no painful land-for-peace deal that has to be made, of the sort that Israel made with Egypt and must one day make with the Palestinians. (The “disputed” scrap of land known as the Shebaa Farms is at most a pretext Hizbullah uses to justify its fighting.) Indeed, a case can be made that this particular conflict is not primarily between Israel and Lebanon at all so much as it is between Israel and Iran, Hizbullah's mentor—and between America and Iran. That makes it much harder to resolve, not least because the superpower, so far from being a mediator, is in effect a protagonist, competing with Iran for domination of the post-Saddam Middle East, and to some extent tempted in this war to use Israel as a proxy.
This is a dreadful new turn. The century-long conflict between Zionism and the Arabs of Palestine has been hard enough to settle on its own, without additional global and regional rivalries superimposed. The cold war prolonged the fight in Palestine. It is no coincidence that some of the most promising peacemaking came after the Soviet Union stopped competing with America to be the dominant power in the Middle East. Now the core conflict is once again becoming entangled in a bigger one—perhaps even more dangerous this time because Iran is more eager than were the secular Arab states of the 1950s and 1960s to put Islam at the centre of the anti-Zionist cause.
From Iran's point of view, Hizbullah's audacity against Israel is a magnificent advertisement for its particular brand of Shia piety. This profoundly discomfits those Arab allies of America such as Saudi Arabia, which aspires to lead Sunni Islam but is made to look feeble whenever it sits on the sidelines during an Arab-Israeli war. It unsettles Egypt and Jordan, which have made their unpopular peaces with Israel. And in the Palestinian territories it fortifies Hamas, which finds religious objections to peace with Israel, at the expense of the more accommodating secularists of Fatah. Even al-Qaeda, which detests Shias and murders them in Iraq, has felt obliged this week to join the fray. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, popped up from his cave to say that Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine were now just one seamless front of warfare between Islam and the Jews and crusaders.
Only disconnect
If the Lebanon war is not just a scrap between neighbours but also a proxy war between Iran and America, how is it going to be possible to bring about a durable peace once it ends? One idea gathering pace among some American foreign-policy realists—in opposition to the neoconservatives—such as Henry Kissinger is to seize this opportunity to bring about the “grand bargain” that has been mooted for years between America and Iran. Since all the region's quarrels—Iran's bomb, Iraq's future, the isolation of Syria, the Hizbullah state inside Lebanon and the unrequited cause of the Palestinians—are interlinked, why not think now about starting to sort out the lot of them?
It certainly would not hurt, after a week in which the Security Council has again told Iran to stop enriching uranium, for America to emphasise again the political and economic benefits Iran stands to gain by complying with this demand. America and Iran must talk. All the same, a bargain this grandiose may be beyond the reach of even the most creative diplomacy.
So it may be more sensible to disconnect some of the pieces than to join too many together. In particular, the outlook for the Palestinians would be less bleak if sundry outsiders did not periodically hijack their cause to mobilise Muslim emotions against Israel, America or both. Between Israel and the Palestinians there is probably still a deal to be made if both show enough courage and generosity. In the end, it is only Israel that can give the Palestinians their state, and only the Palestinians can give Israel the legitimacy it craves in the Middle East. In a region of conflict, it is these two peoples whose interests coincide most closely. Solving that problem remains the best of all ways to promote a wider peace. The war beyond the war
IN CHESS they call it a Zugzwang, the position that arises when your next move, any next move, is liable to lead to disaster. That is roughly where Ehud Olmert finds himself this week. If Israel's prime minister ceases fire now, Hizbullah will claim that it has won simply because, after three weeks of pounding by the regional superpower, its men were still putting up a fight and firing their rockets into Israel's towns and villages. But if Mr Olmert chooses instead to push deeper into Lebanon, he risks sinking Israel in a costly guerrilla war like the one it thought it had ended by leaving Lebanon six years ago.
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